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In recent years, State inefficiency in delivering some public goods to everybody has 
been the main argument set forth by those who sustain that markets should play a more 
active role in providing those goods and services that are needed to secure human 
rights. In result, in many parts of the world, we have been witnessing extensive 
privatization of social security and water distribution, for example. This article argues 
that markets are not fully equipped to play the role of a supplier of goods and services 
as human rights, and more specifically of the right to social security and the right to 
water. The main reason for this is that in the language of markets capability to pay is 
the key question whereas within the rights language it is entitlement. If in the first case 
exclusion and inequality are acceptable in the second case the only acceptable situation 
is the one characterized by inclusion and equality. In other words goods and services 
can be unequally distributed, rights cannot. Secondly a provider of goods and services 
as human rights must be a democratically accountable institution, whereas markets are 
anonymous, and therefore, unaccountable by definition. Finally, markets are also 
inefficient in providing goods and services as human rights, either because human 
rights “markets” are not competitive or because market incentives for private provision 





In human rights literature many political scientists still adopt Isaiah Berlin’s 
distinction between negative and positive rights. According to this approach, a positive 
right imposes a moral obligation on a person to do something for someone, while a 
negative right merely obliges others to refrain from interfering with someone's attempt 
to do something. Most civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech or a fair trial, 
usually fall in the first group, and most economic, social and cultural rights, such as the 
right to education or to social security, tend to be included in the second. Despite the 
doctrinal interest of this approach, the distinction between negative and positive rights is 
of little relevance in the practical discussion on responsibility in human rights. Indeed, 
the great majority of rights, the so-called negative as much as the so-called positive, 
demand the affirmative action of providing goods and services. 
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If this seems unquestionable when economic and social rights are concerned - 
tangible goods like water and housing and intangible services like social security must 
be produced in order to secure these human rights – civil and political rights would 
apparently oblige inaction only. It is pure delusion. Would it occur to anyone in their 
right mind that it is possible to guarantee an individual the right to a fair trial by simply 
not opposing this same individual having a fair trial? In order to secure the right to a fair 
trial society needs not only to build the institutions that will conduct the above-
mentioned trials and remunerate the services rendered, but also to build the institutions 
that are supposed to contribute to the training of all the individuals, judges, lawyers, 
clerks and so on called to participate in a trial. 
 
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and the 
community to which he or she belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of these recognized rights, responsibility has become one of 
the major issues in the assertion of human rights. The question that must be answered is, 
therefore, who or what is or should be responsible for providing rights to the individual. 
In other words who or what has the obligation to provide those goods and services that 
constitute rights. In human rights literature in general, the State is usually responsible 
for securing human rights. Thus, wherever there is a right of an individual, there is a 
duty of the State to provide institutional protection to this right (Canotilho 1984; Bobbio 
1992). This means that there is a positive obligation of the State to do everything within 
its power to realize fundamental rights, although many maintain that in the case of 
economic, social and cultural rights there is no subjective right of the citizen in this 
respect (Queiroz 2002: 102). If one must probably admit that the State should be, in the 
last resort, the guarantor of civil and political rights, that does not seem so obvious as 
far as economic, social and cultural rights are concerned. 
 
Can the responsibility model centred in the State be extended to non-State 
agents’ obligations? In an age in which the dominant school in economics is convinced 
that the State must abdicate of playing a leading role in the economy and 
simultaneously human rights are supposed to be one of the major legal instruments 
within international law, it is indispensable to examine the ability of markets, the 
announced alternative to the State, in securing those human rights that demand the 
supply of the goods and services necessary to satisfy individuals’ political demand. The 
United Nations system of human rights was established at a time in which the nation-
state reigned unchallenged. The progressive autonomy of markets, namely of financial 
markets, could, then, suggest a redistribution of responsibility for human rights in order 
to correspond as closely as possible to the distribution of economic influence that 
characterizes contemporary societies. 
 
Commenting on the Subprime Crash, Jacques Sapir argued that this was above 
all the result of an unequal income distribution which induced the American middle 
class to borrow too much in order to maintain its consumption level. According to Sapir 
credit became a proxy for a more balanced income policy (Sapir 2008). As a matter of 
fact, more than just an instrument for maintaining their consumption level, Subprime 
Credit was mainly a proxy for a housing policy which would allow many impoverished 
middle class families to access housing, clearly recognized as a human right by the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the subsequent International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by the general 
assembly of the United Nations in 1966.   3
 
In answering the question in the title the dubious behaviour of markets in this 
case and its critical consequences for the economy can only lead us to say that Subprime 
Crash is above all the dramatic and global expression of the inability of markets to 
secure human rights. Despite the demonstrative power of daily news one must go 
beyond the anecdotal nature of these arguments, though. The inability of markets to 
secure human rights is not just a matter of a bad response to the economic situation but 
also, and perhaps mainly, of an intrinsic inability to deal with human rights, and most 
especially with economic and social rights. The main issue this article wishes to address 
concerns, therefore, the conflicting relationship between market provision of goods and 
services and the promotion of human rights. Water and social security will be the main 
examples of goods and services which need to be provided in order to secure human 
rights examined in this article. Much could be said on many other goods and services 
aiming at securing human rights but these two have the advantage of being relatively 
homogenous goods and services and thus facilitates the analysis. 
 
 
THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES AS HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
As seen above advocates of negative freedom define individual freedom of 
action as a lack of constraint imposed by other individuals or, very commonly, by the 
State. This lack of constraint is supposed to allow the individual to take alternative 
courses of action. However, as the ICESCR recognizes, there are many other constraints 
than just those inferred by the idea of negative freedom. The lack of means also places a 
heavy constraint on the freedom to act. Unless these means are available, like food, 
clothing or shelter, an individual will most certainly be unable to act freely. In his view 
the poverty that leaves the potential litigant unable to go to court is just as much of a 
constraint as arbitrary arrest (Archer 1995: 17). This is precisely the argument that 
advocates of economic, social and cultural rights put forward. Civil and political rights 
do not make sense, or rather are impossible to ensure, without guaranteeing some 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
According to this set of rights it has to be recognized that, in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying 
freedom from fear and deprivation can only be achieved if the conditions are created for 
everyone to enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights, as well as their civil and 
political rights. Indeed, one may legitimately question the substance of the individual’s 
right to choose, be it a political leadership or a religious belief, when facing the 
possibility of immediate death in result of a lack of economic means to obtain medical 
treatment, for instance.  
 
The ICESCR throughout its thirty one articles establishes a set of rights based on 
the peremptory obligation of guaranteeing all individuals the satisfaction of the needs 
without which their life (a dignifying life one should add) would not be possible. The 
first economic right recorded in the covenant concerns the right to self-determination of 
all peoples along with the right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
(art. 1). Next, a set of rights concerning work is formulated. Firstly the right to work 
strictu sensu (art. 6), and secondly the so-called rights at work, which include the right 
to a wage sufficient enough to provide a decent life to the worker and his or her family;   4
safe and healthy working conditions; and paid vacations (art. 7). Finally, the right to 
form trade unions and to go on strike is added to this set of rights (art.8). 
 
The ICESCR also recognizes the right of everyone, regardless of their having a 
job or not, to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions (art. 11). This covenant also proclaims the right to social security, by means 
of protection schemes in illness and old age, for instance (art 9). Within the rights 
covering social protection, special reference must be made to rights concerning the 
protection of mothers for a reasonable period before and after childbirth and those 
protecting children and young persons from economic and social exploitation, namely 
by proposing that signatory countries should institute age limits below which the paid 
employment of child labour are to be prohibited and punishable by law (art. 10). The 
last set of rights recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, to progressively free education, and to 
cultural, artistic and scientific freedom (arts. 12, 13, 14, 15 respectively). Finally it 
should be stressed that the ICESCR proclaims that all rights should be enjoyed by 
everyone without discrimination whatsoever, be it ethnic, religious or political, or based 
on gender or economic status (art. 2). 
 
 
The Provision of Water and Social Security as human rights 
 
It has already been said in the introduction to this text that securing human 
rights, most especially economic, social and cultural rights, demands the production of 
both tangible goods like houses or water, and intangible services like justice or social 
security. As with every human right, this provision of goods and services raises the 
questions of how and by whom should these goods and services be produced, and also 
how should they be allocated within the community. As one would expect, the answer 
to these questions differs according to which goods and services we are talking about, 
according to their nature. Nevertheless, some general questions apply to all. 
 
Economics traditionally divides goods into two main categories, public and 
private, according to the combinations of exclusion and rivalry in their consumption. A 
public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means that the 
consumption of this good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the good left 
for the consumption of other individuals, and that no individual can effectively be 
excluded from consuming that good. Private goods are those that, on the contrary are 
simultaneously excludable and rivalrous. If goods are public it is consensual that the 
state must provide them if, on the contrary they are private, then the market is usually 
better qualified to supply them. In reality, however, it is very hard to make all goods fall 
exclusively into these two categories. 
 
Indeed, based on the combinations of exclusion and rivalry one can determine 
two other categories of goods. There are goods that are rivalrous but non-excludable and 
goods that are excludable but non-rivalrous. Goods that fall into the first group are 
called common pool goods and goods that fall into the second group, toll or club goods. 
In the first case it is impossible or very hard to stop people from consuming these 
goods, but the consumption of one individual limits the consumption of another 
individual. In the other group, consumption of one individual does not affect the ability   5
of another individual to consume in his turn, but it is possible to exclude individuals 
from consumption if they are not willing to pay. What does this tell us about the 
classification of water and social security as goods and services? 
 
From a strictly technical point of view classifying water is not an easy task. 
Sustainable consumption of water in nature, drinking it out of a river or a lake, does not 
imply rivalry nor does it provoke exclusion, and therefore in these circumstances water 
must be considered a public good. This public character of water seems to be suggested 
by Adam Smith when he declared quite a while ago that ‘nothing is more useful than 
water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for 
it’ (Smith 1776). The absence of exchange value, in other words the impossibility of 
reaching a market price, is indeed another interpretation of what a public good is. Non-
rivalry and non-exclusion are reinforced by the fact that there are no property rights on 
water in its first state, that is to say natural. But this does not mean that there should be 
no rules for its distribution besides that of first come first served. Fresh water may not 
be unlimited on the planet, especially if pollution and over-consumption continue at the 
current pace. For this reason it should be more realistic to include water among common 
pool goods where unsustainability of consumption has been identified in the absence of 
strict distributive rules. 
 
However, the form in which water appears before consumers today has not a lot 
to do with the classification proposed above. Indeed, the great majority of the world’s 
population benefits from water by the intermediation of infrastructures such as 
plumbing and other forms of collection and distribution. Contrary to water strictly 
speaking, however, these infrastructures can be privately appropriated which means that 
exclusion and rivalry can be simultaneously introduced in terms of water supply. 
Indeed, one can be excluded from consuming water because one only has access to the 
water tap if willing to pay, and there can be rivalry because one particular water tap may 
only serve one particular home and cannot be used without its owner’s permission. In 
modern times, therefore, water could technically speaking be considered a private good 
like any other.  
 
Let us now classify social security as an economic good, or rather, economic 
service, according to the same methodology. First of all there is no rivalry in the 
consumption of this service, because by benefiting from social security an individual 
does not interfere with another individual’s ability of benefiting from this same service, 
with one slight nuance, however, since some might say that a doctor can only see one 
patient at a time and therefore rivalry is always present. No matter how powerful this 
argument may be, one should not forget that social security and medical treatment are 
not quite synonymous. Social security when concerning health means access to 
treatment, not treatment itself. It is perfectly possible that an individual benefiting from 
social security might never require medical treatment. In this case one cannot say that, 
because an individual never received medical treatment, he or she never benefited from 
social security. Social security is a guarantee of consumption, not consumption itself, as 
one can easily understand with any kind of insurance. Even if there is no rivalry in 
social security, there is nevertheless exclusion. Indeed, it is possible to prevent an 
individual from consuming social security if he or she is not willing to pay. In this sense 
one can classify social security as belonging to the toll or club goods category. In 
conclusion water and social security as goods and services are not strictly public and   6
therefore can be provided by the market. The question one must ask now is should they 
as human rights? Let us now define water and social security as human rights. 
 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
proclaimed in November 2002 the Right to Water as a substantive implication of the 
implementation of the ICESCR, resulting from an extensive interpretation of its Articles 
11 and 12. For the record, the first of these two articles recognizes the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living, and the second the right of everyone to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. In the introduction of the text in 
which these substantive implications are commented upon, it is said that water is a 
limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and health, that this 
human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity and that it is a 
prerequisite for the realization of other human rights (UN 2002: 1). In order to reinforce 
the justification for classifying water as a human right one should also put forward 
article 15 of the ICESCR that recognizes the right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life. Indeed, many religious rites also demand the use of water. According to this 
committee the human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use. Finally, a 
report on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water 
and sanitation was submitted to the Human Rights Council in accordance with Council 
resolution 7/22 on Thursday 17 September 2009 in which the comments referred to 
above are reinforced opening the way to a formal international recognition of the human 
right to water (Albuquerque 2009). 
 
According to the various proclamations concerning human rights, social security 
can be considered a human right because it constitutes a prerequisite to the realisation of 
other rights such as the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living or the 
right to the protection of motherhood (CESCR 2006), all concurring to the assertion of 
the right to life. The right to social security is explicitly referred to in the UDHR, 
articles 22 and 25, and in the ICESCR article 9. In order to avoid misunderstandings, we 
should perhaps define what is to be considered as social security, since its definition is 
exceedingly sparse in every human rights proclamation. Social security can be 
considered, therefore, as the set of institutions, measures, obligations and transfers 
whose purpose is, firstly, to guarantee access to health and social services, and, 
secondly, to provide income security to meet life’s risks, in other words to avoid or 
alleviate poverty resulting from unemployment, disability and old age (ILO 2005). 
 
If one accepts the right to water or the right to social security, then one should 
also accept that each individual has some sort of credit with society concerning the 
availability of drinking water or social protection. If there is not enough water or social 
protection for everybody and therefore the individual’s right to water and to social 
security is not being secured, to whom then should he or she turn? As the right of an 
individual corresponds perforce to the duty of another or of the community at large, the 
responsibility issue is crucial in human rights language. In economics language, in turn, 
if the right is represented by demand, duty should be consubstantiated by supply. 
Following this same line of thought, if the individual represents demand who or what 
should represent supply? The question at stake here is can markets play that role, in 
other words, can markets secure or provide human rights such as water and social 
security? 
   7
 
THE INABILITY OF MARKETS TO SECURE HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
  One of the crucial questions one should answer about asserting human rights 
consists in determining which institution is better qualified to ensure every citizen the 
amount of goods and services that meets both the quantitative and the qualitative 
requirements of securing economic, social and cultural rights. If water strictly speaking 
can be classified as a public or a common pool good, and tap water as a private good, 
the entire process of providing safe water to people displays a dual character. On the 
one hand water can be, and indeed has been on many occasions, distributed by private 
companies. On the other hand, water being also a human right one is forced to admit the 
preponderance of its public character. Indeed, if water constitutes a human right because 
it is essential to life and a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other human rights, the 
excludable character of private goods means, therefore, that it is possible for an 
individual to be deprived of the human right to water on the basis of purchasing power. 
This immediately transforms the inability to get access to water into a rights violation 
and consequently into a major political issue. 
 
In recent years state inefficiency in delivering water to all, for example, most 
especially in developing countries (see UNDP 2006), has constituted the main argument 
set forth by those who sustain that markets should play a more active role in providing 
those goods and services that satisfy human rights. As a result, one has been witnessing 
extensive privatization of water supply in developed as much as in developing 
countries. The same sort of discussion has also taken place on social security with some 
nuances resulting from the obvious singularities of this service. In the following pages 
we will try to demonstrate that markets are not fully equipped to play the role of the 
main provider of human rights because, first, the markets do not state social 
preferences; second, they are not accountable; and finally, they are inefficient. 
 
 
Markets do not state Social Preferences 
 
  First of all, when universal rights such as human rights are being promoted, one 
is asserting a social preference. Rights, if they are to be fully taken as rights, must be 
equally allocated amongst all those entitled to enjoy them within the community. Basic 
liberties, for instance, do not admit any allocation other than an egalitarian one (see 
Rawls 1972). Indeed, it is quite unacceptable for some individuals to deposit more votes 
in the ballot box than others. One need not be reminded that universal suffrage, as 
opposed to historical property or tax-based electoral systems for example, confers one 
and only one vote to every citizen of voting age. Beyond the legitimate statutory 
exceptions, basic liberties do not admit exclusion either. If a citizen is arbitrarily 
excluded from participating in an election, this not only means that he is denied his right 
to vote but also that the right to vote is not ensured in the community to which he 
belongs, even if all except one are allowed to participate in the voting. Indeed, rights are 
either guaranteed for all or they are not guaranteed for anyone. 
 
In the case of the provision of goods and services as human rights  one is 
therefore inclined to admit that the degree to which people’s needs are covered in a 
certain instance may be better than in another. A situation in which, for instance, all the 
population benefits from safe tap water or social security is better than any other.   8
Actually, when human rights are concerned universal coverage is the only acceptable 
situation, at least as a tendency. Any situation other than universal coverage must 
therefore be considered not only inferior, but also unacceptable, as it could constitute a 
violation of a human right. 
  
In this sense, markets should have a hard time promoting human rights simply 
because they do not state social preferences, such as preferences of structure 
concerning, for example, income distribution or water and social security coverage. As 
a result of all the information conveyed by economic agents, markets can state many 
preferences in response to consumer’s wants, as for instance how much water and social 
security to produce, how and when, to satisfy viable demand but they do not have 
arguments to assert that universal coverage is better than any other structure of water 
and social security distribution. 
 
In satisfying viable demand the issue is ability to pay, in other words purchasing 
power. With rights, on the other hand, the issue is quite different; the heart of the matter 
here concerns entitlement, the criteria according to which an individual should be 
qualified to enjoy rights (purchasing power being obviously excluded) and the 
consequences of the use of such criteria. What matters for markets is that agents are 
satisfied, in other words that sellers are able to sell the amounts they wish at market 
prices and that buyers are able to buy what they intend at the same market prices. The 
fact that some agents are not able to buy what they wish at market prices on account of 
an excessively tightened budget constraint is of almost no concern. In terms of private 
goods in general this may be acceptable, but when private goods are taken as rights 
exclusion, once again, becomes intolerable. 
 
Therefore, and despite the fact that there are many examples of public inability 
to achieve universal water coverage, especially in developing countries, like in Dar-es-
Salam, Tanzania, or in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso, for example, where less than 30% 
of the population is connected to the public water distribution system frequently 
because water is still too expensive for poor households (UNDP 2006: 9-10), water 
distribution supplied by markets has proven to be a poor alternative to public 
distribution when universality is at stake. In Manila, in the Philippines, for instance, 
Maynilad Water Services, a private company controlled by multinational corporation 
Suez-Ondeo, which held Manila's west zone concession, raised tariffs by as much as 
400% between 1997 and 2003. Manila Water Company, owned by the Ayala 
Corporation, the east zone concessionaire, in its turn raised water tariffs by 700% in the 
same period (Netto 2005). Considering the purchasing power of the average citizen of 
the Philippines and the fact that for the same period prices in general rose 36.9% in the 
country (WDID, 2008), it should not be difficult to predict that the privatization of 
water distribution resulted in a considerable part of Manila’s population being deprived 
of their right to water. As a matter of fact, unlike Manila Water, Maynilad has since 
returned to public management by Manila’s Metropolitan Water and Sewerage System 
as a result of public protest motivated by unmet concession agreement targets in terms 
of coverage, pricing, service obligations, non-revenue water and water quality 
(Montemayor 2005). 
 
In some of the poorer neighborhoods of La Paz, Bolivia, the same multinational 
company Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, through its local subsidiary Aguas del Illimani, also 
raised water tariffs by 600% in 2004 whereas the inflation rate was 4,5% (WDID,   9
2008), and the objective of connecting 15,000 households to the water distribution 
system was cut down to zero (Chavez 2005: 11). As a result of the pressure exerted by 
more than six hundred district associations, the government eventually revoked the 
concession contract with Aguas del Illimani (Chavez 2005: 11) just as happened with 
the American based Bechtel in April 2000 in Cochabamba after dramatic water tariff 
increases and expropriation of community water systems (Gómez and Terhorst 2005). 
  
Comparative history concerning water supply can also explain why the market 
fails in efficiently promoting the right to water in poor countries. Private companies 
supplying water in developed countries have inherited a heavy infrastructure paid by 
past public investments, supplying universal coverage to an average high-income 
market. In developing countries, on the other hand, limited and frequently damaged 
infrastructure, low levels of connection and high levels of poverty, increase the tensions 
between business profitability and the supply of water at a fair price to all. In Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, for example, the water concession holder managed to expand the 
connections to the supply system, but at a slower pace than agreed in the concession 
contract because progress was slower in the poorer areas of the city. In Jakarta, 
Indonesia, likewise, three quarters of the new connections concerned medium and high 
income households or private and public institutions (UNDP 2006). As a matter of fact, 
according to Pedro Arrojo (2006), multinational companies, which got hold of the 
majority of the privatized concessions in the world, may be interested in water 
distribution management but not in infrastructural investment. 
 
Market provision of social security as a human right seems as limited as for 
water. According to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights only 20% 
of the world’s population benefits from adequate social protection (CESCR 2006), 
which makes social security one of the lesser guaranteed human rights on the planet. 
These figures concern both private and public schemes. It is hard to illustrate the 
specific incapacity of markets to cover the needs of the population as far as the human 
right to social security is concerned, as there is no country in the world where social 
security is fully privately provided. Indeed, in most of the countries where private 
companies have access to the provision of social security they complement or are 
complemented by a public scheme. In this respect the United States is, probably, the 
closest example to a fully privatized provision of social security one can find. 
 
Here, incapacity to pay for health insurance, at the origin of many individuals’ 
inability to benefit from medical treatment, has been one of the major arguments put 
forward to claim the reform of the country’s health system. Indeed, in the United States 
of America the cost of health insurance is considered to be responsible for the fact that, 
in 2007, 28% of adults, or an estimated 50 million people, were not insured or had 
experienced a time without coverage in the past 12 months (Collins et al, 2008: 3). To 
this exclusion of a large part of the population from the benefit of the human right to 
social security one should also add inequality, as amongst those that can afford health 
insurance many are inadequately or underinsured (Collins et al, 2008: 10). 
 
 
Markets are not accountable 
 
  As we have already mentioned, in the language of human rights the rights of 
individuals correspond to duties of other individuals, in other words human rights   10
represent the rights which individuals have over the conduct of others. Therefore, if the 
rights of some individuals are not ensured, this is due to the fact that other individuals or 
institutions have failed in carrying out their duties. In human rights language, 
responsibility is therefore a key issue. This responsibility issue is reinforced by yet 
another element of the human rights’ rhetoric. In the language of markets deprivation 
has been seen as the outcome of either nature’s random behavior or human 
incompetence. In other words, deprivation resulted either from nature playing nasty 
tricks on people or people being incapable of making the right decisions in addressing 
basic economic problems. The search for the good life signified, therefore, a struggle to 
dominate nature or to predict and mitigate its whims, and a quest for efficiency in 
human action. The rhetoric of human rights, in contrast, introduces a substantially 
different approach to deprivation by transforming economic problems into possible 
rights violations, that is to say into discrimination or structures that prevent people from 
exercising rights (Offenheiser and Holcombe 2003: 275).  
 
  When the State, for example, fails in ensuring an individual his human rights, 
the State is accountable, either legally in a court of law or politically through elections. 
If the market fails in ensuring human rights, whom should an individual turn to? The 
State is both elected and known, the market, on the other hand, is by definition 
anonymous. Indeed, markets in a capitalist society are at the most indirectly accountable 
to corporations’ shareholders (Ellerman 2007: 16-17). According to this logic of 
corporate governance in a capitalist society, decisions are not taken by all those affected 
by them, but by those who own the capital. Therefore, at best, in a society where 
economic decisions are mainly taken by the market, democratic control becomes 
dependent on each shareholder’s financial weight; at worst, citizens will be governed by 
an unaccountable entity. In this sense, the market is therefore unequipped to secure 
human rights in general and the rights to water and social security in particular. 
 
  As a matter of fact, responsibility and democratic control of water suppliers 
has recently proved to be a key element in reaching universal water coverage. In Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, for instance, water services were private until 1904; then the city took 
them over. In 1961 it created a deliberative council and has represented many sectors in 
overseeing the DMAE (Municipal Department of Water and Sanitary Sewage) and 
played an important part in its success (Maltz 2005: 34). The implementation in 1989 of 
the participatory budget, a municipal management system that was created specifically 
in Porto Alegre within which the city people get together in meetings throughout the 
year and decide where the investments are going to be made, brought DMAE even 
closer to society and established a new level in control over the utility (Maltz 2005: 34).  
 
As one might expect, people are mainly interested in obtaining wider access to water 
and sanitation and thus, between 1989 and 1996, the number of households with access 
to water services rose from 94.7% to 99.5% while the percentage of population served 
by the municipal sewage system rose from 73% to 84% (Maltz 2005), these figures 
being the highest in Brazil. 
 
 
Markets are Inefficient 
 
Water can be used by people for different purposes, from human consumption to 
production activities such as transportation, industry, agriculture and fishing, as well as   11
cultural, recreational, leisure, conservation and environmental activities. Taking into 
consideration the diversity of uses and the indispensability of water to satisfy basic 
human needs, a new question is raised, which is how to prioritize the different types of 
water demand. A competitive market allocates water between different alternative uses 
in accordance with the laws of economic efficiency. These laws only consider the direct 
use value for human consumption and the value of economic goods produced when 
water is used as an input. However, supporting water allocation between alternative uses 
based on laws of economic efficiency can produce inefficient social allocation, 
especially when the decision is between human consumption and agricultural or 
industrial uses. Being inefficient from the point of view of human consumption, this 
market mediation can therefore lead to the violation of an individual’s right to water. 
  
From this perspective, and given its crucial role in human survival, it is perfectly 
admissible for society to establish priorities. In this context, when water supplies are not 
enough to satisfy all uses, it seems quite acceptable that priority should be given to 
direct human consumption over other uses, such as leisure. As a matter of fact, this 
priority should be kept even when the alternative use is land irrigation. Though 
agriculture is vital to guarantee other human rights, like access to food, it is possible to 
farm without irrigation, whereas it is impossible for a human being to survive without 
drinking water. However, in many parts of the planet, mainly in developing countries, 
the lack of access to irrigation water can lead to a denial of the right to food and 
indirectly to a violation of the right to water in those cases where water is indispensable 
to produce crops. 
  
Markets are also eco-inefficient. Indeed, water is exhaustible over a given period 
of time, which means that its use can only be renewable if the extraction rate is lower, 
or equal, to the recharge rate. This is a vital question, since securing human rights in 
general and the right to water in particular does not consider any sort of term beyond 
which it would be acceptable for a human right to be no longer guaranteed, which 
implies that water as a human right should have a sustainable use. In such 
circumstances, it is difficult to conciliate individual and social interests, since no market 
mechanism can prevent the total amount of individual consumption resulting from the 
maximization of individual utility from exceeding the recharge rate. This issue becomes 
more acute in case of water contamination as the price mechanism per se cannot 
generate enough incentives to treatment and reuse by markets, except in regions where 
extreme scarcity boosts water prices. 
 
Finally one must say that water markets can hardly be called markets. Indeed, 
for technological reasons, water distribution can be considered a natural monopoly in 
the sense that if competition is allowed between companies in order to get hold of a 
concession, the consumer cannot choose his supplier as he can, for instance, with cable 
television or telephone. If one is dissatisfied with one’s cable television or telephone 
supplier, one can change. On the contrary, one cannot change on an individual basis 
one’s water supplier. For this set of reasons, therefore, and if economic, social and 
cultural rights are to be taken seriously, it is of the utmost importance that decisions 
concerning water distribution should be made by all those affected by that same 
distribution, which means that it should be submitted do democratic control, implying 
therefore public, or at least mixed, rather than private management alone. 
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The arguments sustaining market inefficiency in providing social security are 
quite different from those concerning water distribution as a result of each sector’s 
idiosyncrasies. Efficiency means, here, the ability to cover risks adequately. The main 
argument concerns the fact that the insurance market, as any inter-temporal market, is 
affected by problems related to incentives and information. These problems explain 
why, for instance, insurance companies have never been able to supply a product that 
can adequately cover the risk of unemployment, despite the fact that such a product 
would probably be highly praised by workers. One can identify two main problems 
affecting private unemployment insurance. 
  
The first, which will not be explored too deeply here, concerns the difficulty in 
calculating both the insurance premium and the substitution income received by the 
insured in the event of unemployment. The second concerns asymmetric risks or the so 
called anti-selection phenomenon (see Piketty 1997). One can easily presume that some 
workers are more exposed to the risk of becoming unemployed than others. It is, 
therefore, quite natural that competition between insurance companies could lead to 
attracting preferentially low risk clients, in other words workers that have a weak 
probability of losing their jobs, and if possible to exclude those that, on the contrary, 
have a stronger probability of becoming unemployed. This problem could be mitigated 
if income was in some way indexed to the risk of unemployment. The higher the risk of 
becoming unemployed, the higher the wage would be and therefore the higher the 
insurance premium. But that is obviously not the case. Actually, workers who suffer 
from a higher risk of unemployment such as those who are poorly qualified are 
frequently also those who get the lowest wages. On the other hand, one could also 
consider as an injustice that those workers who are submitted to the highest risk of 
unemployment should, in addition, be those who must pay the highest insurance 
premiums. 
  
If private unemployment insurance does not seem to attract private enterprise, 
private health insurance or private retirement pension schemes have been quite 
successful. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the market intrinsically fails in providing 
health insurance and retirement pensions as human rights, as well. As far as health 
insurance is concerned, there are two main arguments to sustain public instead of 
private provision. First of all, where health is concerned, only the supplier or in other 
words the doctor can correctly measure its value, which means that with private 
insurance there is a risk of consumers being forced to support excessive prices and 
excessive consumption (Piketty 1997). Secondly, a purely private system would most 
certainly try to calculate each subscriber’s health risk, leading to the same problems 
detected above with the unemployment insurance. 
  
Let us now examine retirement pensions. The main problem here consists in the 
market’s imperfection when dealing with transferring an individual’s income from the 
active period to the retirement period. In other words, through capitalization, in contrast 
with the public contribution system, a private insurance company cannot guarantee by 
the end of its customer’s active period a comfortable level of income without operating 
in financial markets (Piketty 1997). To start with, the inherent uncertainty attached to 
most financial operations should prevent the epithet ‘security’ being applied to a 
pension obtained in such a manner. One can agree with the fact that modern 
management systems can significantly reduce the risk of the above-mentioned 
operations, and sometimes can even provide higher pensions to retired workers.   13
Nevertheless, one should not be talking of social security but simply of investment, two 
substantially different concepts. 
  
An individual may prefer one to the other, and it could even be demonstrated 
that by choosing a private pension scheme an individual would benefit from a higher 
income than by choosing a public system, but in the end a private scheme still would 
not be social security. Indeed, with a public pension system, income is an a priori 
guarantee which constitutes the essence of a right, whereas with a private pension 
scheme, income constitutes an a posteriori result of a financial operation, whose 
profitability is submitted to probability, an uncertainty that contradicts the binding 





We have seen in the previous pages that human rights, most especially 
economic, social and cultural rights, demand the production of both tangible goods, 
such as houses or water, and intangible services such as justice or social security. As for 
every human right this provision of goods and services raises the questions of how, and 
by whom, these goods and services should be produced, and ultimately, how they 
should be distributed within the community. Despite the fact that the State has not been 
able to adequately provide rights such as water and social security everywhere, we 
sustain that markets do not constitute an alternative. This is not due to any sort of 
incompetence or insincerity of the markets, though. 
 
Rather than charging the hidden interests in the economy, somewhat taken as 
illegitimate or just unethical, for the incapacity in asserting the human right to water and 
to social security, as it could ensue from the debate concerning individual responsibility 
in the recent financial crisis, for example, one should concentrate on the logic of market 
economy itself. First, economic rationality and human rights seem lost in translation. 
Indeed, market’s postulates are intrinsically contradictory with human rights as the best 
possible result according to market logic, a result that may encompass inequality and 
exclusion for instance, can easily constitute a violation according to human rights 
principles. 
  
Second, the market, as an absolute value and an infallible means of rationally 
allocating goods, tends to reduce all categories of goods, and, thus, of rights, to only 
one, the commodity. This commodification of society, which is at the foundation of the 
market discourse, is contradictory with a society whose purpose is to enhance human 
rights. Indeed, to produce goods and services in order to satisfy a consumer’s viable 
demand is one thing; to produce these exact same goods and services in order to satisfy 
a citizen’s request is quite another. The tension lies precisely along the line that 
separates these two different manifestations of an individual need; the former of an 
economic and therefore private nature, and the latter of a political and therefore public 
nature. The production of goods and services as human rights has an essentially 
normative character that implies responsibility and accountability. By transforming 
rights into commodities the market overrides both concepts. 
  
Only public provision (or at least strong regulation of market provision) of those 
goods and services that satisfy rights adequately responds to the demands of   14
accountability and universality. This public provision does not have to be ensured by 
the State, however. The democratic principle of subsidiarity sustains that decisions 
concerning rights must be decentralized to a point as close to the people concerned as 
possible. As regards water distribution, for instance, local governments have indeed 
frequently obtained the best results in reconciling accountability and universality with 
economic and environmental efficiency, the city of Porto Alegre in Brasil being the 
perfect illustration of such an advantage. 
 
In relation to social security, only a public system, or strongly regulated, can 
guarantee that individuals are treated equally in their access to health insurance, for 
example. In other words only a public system can guarantee that despite his or her 
medical history an individual is not left out of social protection. Furthermore, as far as 
retirement pensions are concerned, privatization transforms a right into an investment, 
and even if one may end up concluding a posteriori that a particular private investment 
can produce more utility for the individual than public social security, such investment, 
hazardous by nature, lacks that element which constitutes the essence of a right, that is 
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